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ABSTRACT. For computer simulation models to usefully inform climate risk management
decisions, uncertainties in model projections must be explored and characterized. Because
doing so requires running the model many times over, and because computing resources
are finite, uncertainty assessment is more feasible using models that need less computer
processor time. Such models are generally simpler in the sense of being more idealized, or
less realistic. So modelers face a trade-off between realism and extent of uncertainty
quantification. Seeing this trade-off for the important epistemic issue that it is requires a
shift in perspective from the established simplicity literature in philosophy of science.
1 Introduction
Computer simulation models are now essential tools in many scientific fields, and a
rapidly-expanding philosophical literature examines a host of accompanying methodological
and epistemological questions about their roles and uses (e.g., Beisbart and Saam, 2019;
Frigg and Reiss, 2009; Gru¨ne-Yanoff and Weirich, 2010; Jebeile, 2017; Weisberg, 2013;
Winsberg, 2010, 2018). Climate science is one such field (Edwards, 2001), and questions
about the interpretation and reliability of the simulation modes used to understand, attribute,
and predict climate change have received considerable attention (e.g., Frigg et al., 2013,
2015; Lloyd, 2010, 2015; Lloyd and Winsberg, 2018; Oreskes et al., 2010; Parker, 2011, 2013;
Petersen, 2012; Steele and Werndl, 2016; Thompson et al., 2016; Veze´r, 2016).
One conspicuous feature of scientific discourse about the simulation models used in climate
science, and in environmental modeling more broadly, is the attention given to where a model
lies on a spectrum from simple to complex (e.g., Jakeman et al., 2006; McGuffie and
Henderson-Sellers, 2001; Smith et al., 2014). While this attention to model complexity has
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informed some of the philosophical discourse on simulation modeling (e.g., Parker, 2010), its
relevance for the literature on simplicity in science remains largely unexplored.
This literature on simplicity addresses whether and why simpler theories (or hypotheses,
models, etc.) might be—other things being equal—better than complex ones. Different ways
of unpacking “simpler” and “better” yield a diversity of specific theses, with correspondingly
different justifications (see Baker, 2016; Sober, 2015, for details and history). A number of
distinctly modern variants rest on mathematical theorems tying well-defined notions of
simplicity to benefits such as predictive accuracy (Akaike, 1973; Forster and Sober, 1994),
reliability (Vapnik, 1998; Harman and Kulkarni, 2007), and efficient inquiry (Kelly, 2004,
2007). Arguably more domain-specific appeals to parsimony include instances in phylogenetics
(see Sober, 1988, 2015) and animal cognition (Sober, 2009, 2015; Clatterbuck, 2015).
Here we discuss a notion of simplicity drawn from scientific discourse on environmental
simulation modeling and expound its importance in the context of climate risk management.
The new idea that we bring to the simplicity literature is that simplicity benefits the
assessment of uncertainty in the model’s predictions. The short explanation for this is that
quantifying uncertainty in the predictions of computer simulation models requires running the
model many times over using different inputs; simpler models allow this to be done more
thoroughly and more rigorously because they use less computer processor time. (The
quantification of uncertainty in light of present knowledge and available data should be clearly
distinguished from the reduction of uncertainty that may occur as knowledge and data
accumulate over time. We address the former, not the latter.)
While complexity obstructs uncertainty quantification, complex models may behave more like
the real-world system, especially when pushed into Anthropocene conditions. So there is a
trade-off between a model’s capacity to realistically represent the system and its capacity to
tell us how confident it is in its predictions. Both are desirable from a purely scientific or
epistemic perspective as well as for their contributions to the model’s utility in climate risk
management. Whether simpler is better in any given case depends on details that go beyond
the scope of this paper, but the critical importance of uncertainty assessment for addressing
climate risks (e.g., Reilly et al., 2001; Smith and Stern, 2011) is why simpler models can be
epistemically better for informing decisions.
In what follows, we introduce the relevant notion of simplicity and a way to measure it (§2).
We then explain the link from simplicity to uncertainty quantification (§3), arguing that
through this link, simplicity becomes epistemically relevant to model choice and model
development (§4). We briefly discuss the resulting trade-off, highlighting the roles of
non-epistemic values and high-impact, low-probability outcomes in mediating the importance
of uncertainty assessment for climate risk management (§5).
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2 Simplicity and run time
Environmental simulation models populate a spectrum from simple to complex, and attention
to a model’s position on this spectrum is a pervasive feature of both published research and
everyday scientific discourse. All computational models idealize their target systems by
neglecting less important processes and by discretizing a spatially and temporally continuous
reality. What makes a model more complex is: explicit representation of more processes and
feedbacks thought to operate in the real-world system (or more detailed representation of
them), and/or greater resolution in the discretization (i.e., smaller grid size or shorter time
step). Greater complexity can allow for a more realistic depiction of the target system, while
simpler models must work with a more idealized picture.
Realistic depictions can provide benefits but come at a cost: complex models demand more
computer processor time. Here we use the length of time needed to run the simulation model
on a computer, or the model’s run time, as a proxy for model complexity. Run time is, of
course, a processor-dependent measure: a faster computer processor can run the same
program in less time. But this will not hamper our discussion since we are ultimately
concerned with between-model comparisons that can be relativized to fixed hardware without
loss of import.a Moreover, differences in processor speed are in practice relatively small (in
the neighborhood of times two) when compared with differences in run time across models
(factors of tens to trillions). Run time also depends on the timespan simulated. But this too
is something we can hold constant across models in order to compare apples to apples.
Another feature of run time as a measure of simplicity is that it applies to models understood
in the most concrete sense. Run time is not a feature of calculations understood abstractly
but of a specific piece of computer code written in a specific programming language (and run
on a specific machine). A consequence of this is that two pieces of code with meaningfully
different run times can instantiate what is, in some sense, the same model. What that means
for our discussion is that the trade-off we examine applies most unyieldingly to
computationally efficient programming; inefficiently-coded models can, to a point, be sped up
without sacrificing realism.
Run time can be contrasted with other concepts already implicated in discussions of
simplicity’s role in science, for example, the number of adjustable parameters in a hypothesis.
Run time quantifies the amount of calculating needed to use the model, while number of
parameters concerns the model’s plasticity in the face of observations. Simulation models
contain adjustable parameters, but their number is often poorly defined, since quantities
appearing in the computer code might be fixed in advance for one application but allowed to
aAn alternative, processor-independent way to quantify computational expense might be to count the number
of floating-point operations (FLOPs) required by the model’s compiled program. But this is not a common metric;
modelers typically know their model’s run time but not its FLOP count, and the processor-hour is the usual unit
in which scientific computing resources are allocated and purchased. So we continue with run time.
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vary in the next. Run time is typically insensitive to the choice of how many parameters to
treat as adjustable in a given application.b
To make the discussion more concrete (and point readers to further details) we introduce a
small collection of models that together illustrate the simplicity–complexity spectrum in
environmental simulation modeling. We choose from models that have been used to
investigate the contribution to sea-level rise from the Antarctic ice sheet (AIS), a key source
of uncertainty about future sea-level rise on time scales of decades to centuries (Bakker,
Louchard, and Keller, 2017; Bakker, Wong, et al., 2017; DeConto and Pollard 2016).
The Danish Antarctic Ice Sheet model (DAIS) (Shaffer, 2014; Ruckert et al., 2017) is the
simplest of four models we consider here. It represents the AIS as a perfect half-spheroid
resting on a shallow cone of land—a highly aggregate representation in the sense that just a
few numbers summarize a vast and varied landscape (the AIS is larger than the United
States). DAIS represents several key processes governing ice mass balance, including snow
accumulation and melting at contact surfaces with air, water, and land.
The Building blocks for Relevant Ice and Climate Knowledge model (BRICK) (Bakker et al.,
2017; Wong et al., 2017), couples a slightly-expanded version of DAIS with similarly
aggregate models of global atmosphere and ocean temperature, thermal expansion of ocean
water, and contributions to sea-level from other land ice (glaciers and the Greenland ice
sheet). Compared to DAIS, BRICK represents an additional AIS process (marine ice sheet
instability), as well as a number of interactions with other elements of the global climate
system, including feedback between sea level change and AIS behavior.
The Pennsylvania State University 3-D ice sheet-shelf model (PSU3D) (Pollard and DeConto,
2012; DeConto and Pollard, 2016) includes fewer global-scale interconnections than BRICK
but a much richer representation of both AIS processes and local ocean and atmosphere
interactions. PSU3D is a spatially resolved model of AIS in the sense that spatial variation in
ice thickness and underlying topography are explicitly represented and incorporated into AIS
dynamics. PSU3D represents many addition AIS processes (beyond DAIS), including ice flow
through deformation and sliding, marine ice cliff instability, and ice shelf calving.
The last and most complex model we use to illustrate the simplicity spectrum is the
Community Earth System Model (CESM) (Hurrell et al., 2013; Lipscomb and Sacks, 2013;
Lenaerts et al., 2016), incorporating spatially resolved atmosphere, ocean, land surface, and
sea ice components and allowing global ocean and atmosphere circulation to interact with the
AIS. While dynamic (two-way) coupling of CESM with a full AIS model is still under
bStrictly speaking, a model does not have a single run time but a range of run times, one for each parameter
choice. Still, we can continue to speak sensibly of run time as a property of the model, since different parameter
choices typically result in similar run times so long as time step and resolution are not treated as parameters.
Because these two features contribute to our notion of simplicity, and because they are generally held fixed
during calibration and projection, we see them as part of what defines the model. It’s a question of how you
individuate models; on our approach, same model entails same time step and resolution.
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development (Lipscomb, 2017, 2018), recent work (Lenaerts et al., 2016) uses a static ice
sheet surface topography to investigate one aspect of future AIS dynamics, the surface mass
balance (net change in ice mass due to precipitation, sublimation, and surface melt).
The resolution and run time of the models described above are provided in Table 1. Figure 1
summarizes and illustrates the models with special attention to key differences in complexity
that account for their different run times.
model resolution,
AIS (km)
resolution,
atmosphere (km)
approximate
run time (min)
reference
DAIS n/a n/a .001 Ruckert et al. (2017)
BRICK n/a n/a .1 Wong et al. (2017)
PSU3D 10 40 (regional) 25,000 DeConto and Pollard (2016)
CESM 110∗ 110 (global) 2,000,000,000 Lenearts et al. (2016)
Table 1: Resolution and approximate run time of four simulation models. Run times are for
240,000-year hindcasts, which enable model calibration to incorporate key paleoclimate data.
Model configurations are as per the reference. ∗Refers to resolution of CESM’s land surface
component used to calculate surface mass balance. Based on Ruckert et al. (2017); Wong
et al. (2017); DeConto and Pollard (2016); Bakker et al. (2016); Lenaerts et al. (2016); UCAR
(2016), and personal communication with Kelsey Ruckert, Tony Wong, and Rob Fuller.
3 Epistemic relevance for model choice
Having introduced a notion of simplicity and a way to measure it, we now turn to the benefits
enabled by this kind of simplicity. The proximate consequence of using a simpler model is that
shorter run time allows for more model runs. That, in turn, has consequences for what one
can learn from the model. But we begin with the proximate step.
Given a computing budget of some number of processor-hours, a simple calculation of
computing budget divided by run time yields a theoretical maximum for the number of times
the model can be run. Figure 2a displays this reciprocal relationship for two example
computing budgets. Each point along such a curve corresponds to a different model choice:
moving from left to right, one trades away model complexity (run time) in exchange for more
runs. (Because such plots become hard to read with larger numbers, it will be helpful to use a
logarithmic scale on the axes; we introduce this visualization in Figure 2b.)
As per Figure 2, run time and a computing budget determine how many model runs can be
carried out. This run limit in turn constrains what methods can be employed at key stages of a
modeling study, including calibration and projection. Model calibration is a process of tuning,
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Figure 1: Schematic diagrams illustrating four environmental simulation models discussed in
the main text. Based on configurations of DAIS, BRICK, PSU3D and CESM in Ruckert et al.
(2017), Wong et al. (2017), DeConto and Pollard (2016) (Pliocene simulation), and Lenaerts
et al. (2016), respectively. (Different configurations of the same model may correspond to
somewhat different depictions within the visual schema used here.) CESM includes many
additional system components not pictured.
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Figure 2: (a) Visual depiction of two computing budgets, illustrating the reciprocal relationship
between run time and number of runs. Gray arrows illustrate how to read the figure: a model
that runs in one hour (for example) can be run 24 times on a one-day budget and 120 times
on a five-day budget. (b) The same figure, now plotted on logarithmic axes for a wider view
(we use this format below to accommodate very large and very small numbers in one plot).
weighting, or otherwise constraining the values of adjustable parameters in order to make the
model the best representation that it can be of the system under study. Subsequent projection
involves running the calibrated model into the future to see what it foretells, conditional on
assumptions about how required exogenous (supplied from outside the model) inputs will play
out over the time frame in question.c We discuss calibration and projection in turn, in each
case detailing how the feasible number of model runs constrains the approach taken to these
modeling tasks and what those constraints mean for the quantification of uncertainty.
3.1 Calibration
In the geosciences, model calibration typically aims to exploit both fit with data and prior
knowledge about parameters (which often have a physical interpretation—see, e.g., Shaffer,
cThough we used the word “prediction” in our broad-brush introduction, strictly speaking, we are concerned
with projections. While projection is a subspecies of prediction construed broadly, the two are mutually exclusive
on some finer-grained nomenclatures (Bray and von Storch, 2009; MacCracken, 2001). We use “projection” to
emphasize the hypothetical nature of some assumptions—especially exogenous inputs such as future greenhouse
gas emissions. Another way to put it is that by “projection” we mean a prediction conditional on certain inputs
(like future emissions) about which the modeler explicitly makes no probability judgements.
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2014; Pollard and DeConto, 2012). How this is done varies, and some methods require more
model runs than others. To illustrate the dependence between model simplicity and
calibration methods, we contrast three methods that together span the runs-required gamut.
At one extreme lies Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), the gold standard in Bayesian
model calibration (Bayesian inference is a natural fit for the task of integrating observations
with prior knowledge). Near the middle is an approach called (somewhat confusingly)
precalibration.d At the other extreme lies hand tuning. We describe each below.
For the following discussion, assume a model that is deterministic and at each time step
calculates the next system state as a function of the current state plus exogenous inputs (also
called forcings) impinging on the system. Assume a set of historical observations, both of the
forcings and of quantities corresponding to the model’s state variables. Finally, assume a
measure of fit between the time series of observations and the corresponding series of values
produced by the model when driven by historical forcings (a hindcast).
Bayesian calibration begins with a prior probability distribution over all parameter
combinations (the model’s parameter space) and updates that prior in light of observations to
arrive at a posterior distribution. In principle, the updating takes into account fit between
those observations and every possible version of the model (every combination of parameter
values). The posterior can therefore be calculated exactly (analytically) only where a suitably
tractable mathematical formula maps parameter choices to hindcast–observation fit. This is
not the case for computer simulation models, where fit can be assessed only by running the
simulation and comparing the resulting hindcast with the observations. In this case, the
posterior can still be approximated numerically, but this requires evaluating fit with
observations (running the model each time) for a very large number of parameter choices.
MCMC is a standard approach to numerically approximating Bayesian posterior distributions
and requires tens of thousands to millions of model runs to implement (Kennedy and
O’Hagan, 2001; Metropolis et al., 1953; van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2018; for application to ice
sheet modeling, see Bakker et al., 2016; Ruckert et al., 2017).
In contrast to MCMC’s thorough survey of parameter space, precalibration involves running
the model at a smaller number of strategically sampled parameter-value combinations (e.g.,
250, 1000, and 2000, in Sriver et al., 2012, Ruckert et al., 2017, and Edwards et al., 2011,
respectively). Each of the resulting hindcasts is compared against observations using a
streamlined, binary standard of fit—sorting the hindcasts into two classes: those reasonably
similar to the observations and those not. The result is a dichotomous characterization of
parameter choices as plausible or implausible, the latter unsuitable for use in projection.
The third method we highlight, hand tuning, encompasses a diverse set of practices that share
some common features including varying parameters one at a time rather than jointly, using
dThe approach can be applied as a preliminary step before further calibration (Edwards et al., 2011, §7), but
here we discuss its use as a stand-alone method of calibration (as per Ruckert et al., 2017; Sriver et al., 2012).
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different approaches to model–observation fit (or different observations altogether) for
different parameters, calibrating sub-model components separately, a greater emphasis on
expert assessment of parameter values, and a goal of identifying a single best parameter
choice (for at least a majority of the parameters, sometimes for all). Hand tuning may not be
clearly separated from model development, tends to be less transparent than the previous two
approaches, and examines overall model behavior (and model–observation fit) for a relatively
small number of parameter choices (very roughly, less than one hundred). Examples include
Pollard and DeConto (2012) and Scheller et al. (2007); calibration of general circulation
models (Meehl et al., 2007) and Earth system models such as CESM also generally fall into
this category (Hourdin et al., 2017).
To summarize key points for present purposes, hand tuning samples the smallest number of
possible parameter choices and aims to identify the best among them. Precalibration
examines (on the order of) one hundred times more parameter choices and issues a
dichotomous division of those into the plausible and implausible. MCMC examines (roughly)
one thousand times more than that and exhaustively quantifies the relative plausibility of
every possible parameter choice in the form of a probability distribution. Methods that
demand more model runs do more to characterize uncertainty about parameter choices both
by testing more possible values for the parameters and by furnishing a richer characterization
of uncertainty about those values.
By limiting the feasible number of runs, model complexity undermines the characterization of
parameter uncertainty. Figure 3 illustrates this point using the models from §2 and two
example computing budgets. The lower diagonal line shows a ten-day budget (240
processor-hours). For researchers working on a single processor, this is a plausible limit on the
computing time that can realistically be devoted to model calibration (in part since the
calibration procedure might be repeated three to five times in the course of troubleshooting
and replicating results). Points on or below this line are feasible on a 240 processor-hour
budget. The figure shows that on this budget, DAIS can be calibrated by MCMC and BRICK
by precalibration; PSU3D and CESM cannot be calibrated by any means.
With access to a high-performance computing cluster, much larger computing budgets can be
contemplated. 400,000 processor-hours is a routine high-performance computing allocation in
2019 for research supported by awards from the United States National Science Foundation
(UCAR, 2019). Since 400,000 hours would occupy a single processor for forty-six years, such
a budget can be properly exploited only where the computing workload can be parallelized
(split between multiple processors that run in parallel). Spread over 1,000 processors, 400,000
hours lasts a little over two weeks. While precalibration is easily parallelized, the most
widely-used algorithm for implementing MCMC (Metropolis et al., 1953; Robert and Casella,
1999) requires that model runs be executed serially. There are, however, a number of kindred
approaches to numerically approximating a Bayesian posterior, some of which can be
substantially parallelized (Lee et al., 2019, and references therein).
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Figure 3: Example computing budgets compared with approximate run times for four simulation
models (Table 1). Left boundaries of the shaded columns show approximate minimum run
requirements for calibration methods discussed in the main text (supposing ∼10 parameters are
calibrated). The region below a computing-budget diagonal shows which calibration methods
are feasible for each model on that budget. Figure expands on Bakker et al. (2016).
The upper diagonal in Figure 3 shows a 400,000-hour budget. With those resources, BRICK
can easily be calibrated by numerical Bayesian methods and PSU3D moves to the edge of
precalibration territory. A single hindcast using CESM is still well out of reach. Parallelization
and large computing clusters substantially shift the goalposts, but they cannot dissolve the
fundamental trade-off between model complexity and uncertainty quantification.
3.2 Projection
To the degree that parameter uncertainty has been characterized during calibration, it can
then be propagated into projections. The most frugal approach to projection would be a
single model run looking forward into the future. This can provide a best guess about future
system behavior but does not offer any characterization of uncertainty around that guess. To
do that requires additional runs using alternate, also-plausible parameter choices to generate
10
correspondingly also-plausible projections. A collection of different parameter choices leads to
an ensemble of projections that can collectively characterize how uncertainty in parameter
values translates to uncertainty in future system behavior.
The characterization of parameter uncertainty provided by MCMC (or other Bayesian
numerical methods) allows for projection ensembles that are interpretable probabilistically
(Lee et al., 2019; Ruckert et al., 2017; Wong et al., 2017). Precalibration allows for a
dichotomous grading of plausibility in projected futures. Hand tuning offers little information
about parameter uncertainty that could be propagated into a projection ensemble.
The size of the ensemble (i.e., number of projection runs) needed for high-fidelity propagation
of characterized parameter uncertainty varies depending on many particulars, including the
number of parameters calibrated. (Numbers in the thousands are typical, e.g., Ruckert et al.,
2017, Wong et al., 2017.) By limiting the feasible number of runs, complexity can preclude
projection ensembles of sufficient size. In this way, model complexity constrains not only the
characterization of parameter uncertainty, but also its propagation into projections.
Moreover, parameter values are not the only uncertain inputs into model projections.
Incorporating additional sources of uncertainty requires expanding the projection ensemble.
Where uncertainty about initial conditions makes a meaningful difference to model
projections, these conditions can be varied across ensemble members (e.g. Daron and
Stainforth, 2013; Deser et al., 2014; Sriver et al., 2015). Exogenous forcings are often deeply
uncertain and treated using a scenarios approach (Carlsen et al., 2016; Schwartz, 1996),
multiplying the projection ensemble by the number of scenarios used (three to five is typical).
The model structure (assumptions built into the model regardless of parameter choice) can
also be questioned. Expanding the model structure (Draper, 1995) or explicitly characterizing
model discrepancy (Brynjarsdo´ttir and O’Hagan, 2014) adds new parameters that, in turn,
raise the run demands of both calibration and projection. Alternatively, repeating the entire
work flow (calibration and projection) with several different models multiplies the total runs
by the number of models used (supposing comparable run times).
The overall message on model runs and projection is that the more thoroughly one wishes to
characterize uncertainty in projections, the larger the required ensemble. Specifically, more
thorough characterization of uncertainty means that more of the assumptions built into the
modeling have been questioned, with the consequences of questioning (varying) those
assumptions having been propagated into projected system behavior. Jointly addressing
multiple sources of uncertainty can can lead to very large ensembles (e.g., ten million model
runs, Wong and Keller, 2017).e
eThe computing demands of projection relative to calibration vary from one modeling exercise to the next,
and depend not only on the number of runs used at each stage, but also the length of those runs. Regarding
the AIS, sparse data and processes operating on geological time scales motivate calibration hindcasts of at least
hundreds of millennia. The length of projections, on the other hand, often reflects policy planning horizons, and
may extend only a century or two into the future. Since a model’s run time is generally proportional to the
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We have discussed two key phases in simulation modeling studies: calibration and projection.
In each phase, the approach taken and the results obtainable are strongly constrained by a
model’s run time.f The absolute numbers of runs needed for thorough characterization of
known uncertainties can be very large, easily outstripping realistic computing budgets for
more complex models. A fixed budget can therefore enforce a harsh trade-off between model
complexity (and the realism it enables), and characterization of uncertainty in model
projections. Another way to put it is that complexity limits what can be learned from the
model. For this reason, simplicity is an important scientific, or epistemic consideration in
model choice and model development.
4 Epistemic and non-epistemic benefits
We have argued that simplicity, measured via run time, is epistemically relevant to model
choice. But some readers may be drawn to another framing of the issue, on which the value of
this kind of simplicity is in fact not epistemic but merely practical (and therefore outside the
traditional focus of the simplicity literature). When comparing the consequences of different
model choices, one must hold something else fixed in order to structure the comparison. We
hold the computing budget fixed, in which case simpler models enable better uncertainty
quantification—a recognizably epistemic upshot. But you can make a different sort of
comparison by holding something else fixed. For example, set in stone the desired approach to
calibration and projection (including the number and length of model runs needed). Now the
benefit of simplicity shows up in the processor time required to complete the envisioned
research—which may sound like a practical matter rather than an epistemic one.
Analogous contrasting perspectives can be applied to the issue of cognitive benefits (such as
ease of use), which are routinely dismissed as non-epistemic advantages of simplicity (e.g.,
Baker, 2016; Douglas, 2017; Kelly and Mayo-Wilson, 2010; Sober, 2015). One way to reach
this dismissive conclusion is to assume a fixed research plan detailing the concrete steps to be
taken within a research project (analogous to fixing the desired approach to calibration and
projection). On this sort of comparison, the benefit of employing a simple, easy-to-use theory
rather than a complex and burdensome one appears to be getting the proposed work done
faster or with less effort (a seemingly non-epistemic benefit). On the other hand, a different
sort of comparison can be made by supposing a fixed cognitive-effort “budget,” in which case
easier use translates to more research completed, and as a result, more knowledge (or greater
fulfillment of some epistemic value or other). Both perspectives are valid, each isolating and
number of simulated years, in this case one calibration run (hindcast) needs a thousand times more processor
time than one projection run.
fAnother important modeling activity (that we lack space to discuss, but where a similar lesson applies) is
sensitivity testing (Bankes, 1993; Sobol, 2001; Wong and Keller, 2017); also see the notion of relevant dominant
uncertainty (Smith and Petersen, 2014).
12
illuminating one aspect of a bigger-picture bundle of trade-offs.g
For comparison, it is worth noting that the benefits of other, well-discussed notions of
simplicity also admit of multiple framings, where one perspective highlights an epistemic
upshot and another highlights a practical one. Notions of simplicity that concern the
flexibility of a model or hypothesis get their epistemic relevance as a result of viewing the
choice between simple and complex models while holding fixed the quantity of data available.
AIC scores (see Forster and Sober, 1994), for example, give advice about which statistical
model will yield more accurate out-of-sample predictions after fitting to data. AIC does this
by rewarding fit with data while penalizing flexibility (number of parameters). But the
influence of the parameter penalty decreases as the number of data increase, so the more data
one has, the less simplicity matters. This means that if we instead hold fixed the goal of some
desired degree of predictive accuracy, the benefit of simplicity will now show up in the
quantity of data needed to achieve that goal—or more to the point, the time and expense of
obtaining those data. As before, making a different sort of comparison pivots an epistemic
consideration into one more naturally viewed as non-epistemic.
The fixed-data perspective is often salient because obtaining more data can be costly, slow, or
otherwise impractical (and because the division of scientific labor often divorces statistical
analyses from data gathering). But developments in the nature of scientific research have
made our fixed-budget perspective equally salient. The growth of scientific computing has
shifted work from brains to computer processors where it is more easily quantified and
tracked. The complexity of computational simulation models has shadowed the exponential
growth of computing power, massively increasing the calculating required to answer even
simple questions using a model. At the same time, run-hungry statistical computing methods
for calibration and projection of these simulations multiply the “cognitive effort” advantage of
simpler models thousands to millions of times over, all within the scope of a single study or
publishable unit of research. As a result, the trade-offs illuminated by contrasting modeling
options on a fixed computing budget are now critical to a full understanding of the
epistemology of simulation modeling.
5 Purpose and values
Simplicity facilitates uncertainty quantification, but complex models can be more realistic and
may behave more like the real-world system. How much complexity is the right amount? The
gAcknowledging different ways of making such comparisons (by holding different things fixed) may help clarify
a disagreement on whether using streamlined, less-reliable scientific methods in resource-constrained regulatory
contexts illustrates non-epistemic factors intruding on method choice (Elliott and McKaughan, 2014; Steel,
2016a). If the resource budget is framed as a part of the give and take, then yes, epistemic considerations have
been traded against non-epistemic. But if that budget is viewed as a fixed, external constraint, then the methods
trade-off pits quantity against quality of scientific results, both of which are recognizably epistemic.
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question raises challenging scientific and technical issues requiring deep, case-by-case
integration of geoscience, statistics, computing, and numerical approximation (issues that go
far beyond the scope of this paper). But equally important is the general qualitative point
that, like other aspects of model evaluation (Addor and Melsen, 2019; Haasnoot et al., 2014;
Parker, 2009), much depends on the purpose of the modeling exercise. Simulation modeling
to improve scientific understanding, for example, may demand realism and benefit little from
uncertainty quantification. Informing decisions, on the other hand, often demands attention
to uncertainty (Keller and Nicholas, 2015; Rougier and Crucifix, 2018; Smith and Stern,
2011).
Broadly speaking, risk assessment involves contemplating what outcomes might occur, how
likely each is, and how bad each would be (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). These components
jointly characterize the risk associated with a given course of action. Thinking in terms of
probability and cost, for example, risk might be expressed as expected cost. This is not to say
that risk management requires probabilities (Dessai and Hulme, 2004; Lempert et al., 2013;
Weaver et al., 2013), only that some sense of the plausibility of different outcomes is needed
to assess and manage risk (and that probability estimates are a common medium for this).
Because simplicity enables the required uncertainty quantification while complexity impedes
it, the simplicity–complexity dimension of model choice strongly influences a model’s
adequacy for the purpose of supporting decisions.
In climate risk management specifically, the importance of simplicity is magnified by the role
of high-impact, low-probability outcomes. The limits that complexity places on uncertainty
quantification are particularly unfavorable to estimating the chances of extreme possibilities,
or what are referred to (in probability terms) as the tails of a distribution (e.g., Sriver et al.,
2012; Wong and Keller, 2017; Lee et al., 2019). But since these extreme outcomes (e.g.,
large and/or rapid sea-level rise) are also the most dangerous and costly, estimating their
probability can be central to managing risks, and relatively small changes to their estimated
probability can have an outsize impact on risk calculations and management strategies.
A study by Wong et al. (2017) serves to illustrate these points. The authors use a relatively
simple model of the AIS and other contributors to sea-level rise (BRICK, §2), allowing for
rigorous quantification of parameter uncertainty via MCMC, followed by multiple large
ensembles to propagate that uncertainty into local sea-level rise projections for the city of
New Orleans under each of several forcing (greenhouse gas concentration) scenarios. The
resulting projections (plus other inputs and assumptions) allow for estimation of a
site-specific, economically optimal levee height (such that building any higher costs more than
the flood damage it would be expected to prevent) for each concentration scenario.
The simplicity of BRICK also enabled Wong et al. to characterize some model uncertainty by
repeating the entire workflow for two different model configurations: one with and one
without an additional (poorly-understood but potentially important) mechanism of ice sheet
behavior labelled fast dynamics (DeConto and Pollard, 2016; Pollard et al., 2015). Focussing
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on just one of the city’s five levee rings and assuming a business-as-usual greenhouse gas
scenario (RCP8.5, van Vuuren et al., 2011), the authors quantify the impact of this model
uncertainty by confronting the base-case model’s economically optimal levee with projections
from the fast-dynamics model configuration. The result is an increase in estimated annual
chance of flooding (seawater overtopping the levee) of one-half of one-tenth of a percent
(from eight in ten thousand to thirteen in ten thousand). This seemingly small change adds
$175 million in expected flood damage between now and 2100. A levee 25 centimeters higher
could prevent much of that damage, with estimated net savings of $53 million.
To underline the key points of the illustration: simplicity can contribute to a model’s
adequacy-for-purpose by enabling quantification and propagation of parameter uncertainty
into projections, estimation of probabilities for high-impact, low-probability outcomes, and
characterization of deeper uncertainties (e.g., model structure, forcing scenario) by spelling
out how alternative assumptions impact management strategies. Where complexity
undermines such modeling activities, the model’s adequacy-for-purpose suffers.
The broad-brush purpose of supporting climate risk management can be analyzed further in
any particular instance to reveal specific non-epistemic concerns such as protecting
livelihoods, preserving culture, and saving money and lives (Bessette et al., 2017; CPRAL,
2017). By judging models in light of purpose while also viewing these motivating values as a
part of that purpose, the simplicity–complexity dimension of model choice can be seen as a
coupled ethical–epistemic problem (Tuana, 2013, 2017; Veze´r et al., 2018) in which
motivations and trade-offs encompass both epistemic and ethical values.
The prospect of ethical values motivating model choice may raise concerns about such values
overstepping their proper role in science, and at this point our discussion links up with a large
literature on ethical (or more broadly, non-epistemic) values in science (Douglas, 2009; Elliott,
2017), a portion of which addresses climate science specifically (e.g., Betz, 2013; Intemann,
2015; Parker, 2014; Steel, 2016b; Steele, 2012; Winsberg, 2012). Here we can only note this
connection, leaving further exploration of the topic for future work.
6 Conclusion
Discussions of simplicity’s role in scientific method and reasoning have often recognized a
loose notion of cognitive benefit—or benefit in terms of cognitive effort—associated with
simple theories or models. Yet this aspect of simplicity has largely escaped attention, at least
in philosophical literature, either because the advantage is seen as self-evident and trivial, or
because the upshot is judged a matter of convenience, not epistemology.
This convenience-not-epistemology verdict is a natural consequence of the practice (common
in much traditional philosophy of science) of attending to formal relationships between theory
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and data while idealizing away the messy human element in science. But for today’s computer
simulation models, the “effort” required to operate the model—now understood in terms of
computing resources, not cognitive burden—is too consequential to neglect. Computing
demands sharply constrain how a model can be used and what can be learned from it.
We have used the run time of a simulation model as a measure of the model’s complexity:
simple models run faster and complex models run more slowly. The importance of run time to
the epistemology of computer simulation can be seen clearly by adopting what we have called
a fixed-budget perspective: compare what can be achieved with a simpler model to what can
be achieved with a more complex one on the same computing budget. On such a comparison,
simplicity facilitates quantification of parameter uncertainty and propagation of this and other
sources of uncertainty into model projections, including estimates of chances for
low-probability, high-impact outcomes.
How much one values these benefits is a further question that is tied up with the purpose of a
modeling activity. One purpose for which uncertainty assessment can be critical is informing
climate risk management. One specific example is managing flood risk in costal communities
facing sea-level rise, but there are, of course, many others (e.g., Butler et al., 2014; Keller and
Nicholas, 2015; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018).
None of this takes away from the important purposes served by very complex—and maximally
realistic—environmental simulation models, including advancing understanding of processes
and their interactions across multiple scales, and expanding the range of model structures
that can be explored by the research community as a whole. Our discussion highlights the
high stakes and harsh trade-offs inherent in model choice and model development—and the
central role of simplicity in prioritizing the various scientific and social benefits gleaned from
environmental simulation modeling.
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